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Abstract 
What is the effect of asymmetric power in a dyad negotiation setting, and will the powerful 
(dictator) use expending the pie? It was predicted that the effect of power difference would lead 
to competitive strategy, and that powerful person only expand the pie if they benefit. In this 
study (N = 314) participants introduced to a newly designed mandatory-optional negotiation task, 
striving to create more value using the optional issues. Results show that powerful people do 
indeed react competitive and strive for high individual outcomes. However asymmetric power 
does not seem to influence the decision to expand the pie. Only gaining is a proper effect on 
expanding the pie. This introduces the effect of loss aversion. Sacrificing a little to gain more in 
total, is no intrinsic or purely mindset. Creating more value and come to higher joint outcomes 
and a win-win situation is poorly. The effect of asymmetric power and expanding the pie is 
further discussed in this study. 
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Introduction 
Imagine you are invited to negotiate about the working conditions of your new job with 
your new boss. This is the job you always wanted, although there are some issues that must be 
discussed. Besides these urgent issues, there are some other optional issues that might contribute 
to reaching the highest possible agreement for both parties. However, since these issues are 
optional, you are not sure whether or not your boss will be interested in discussing these issues. 
It might also be the (s)he will just stick to the mandatory issues.  
Literature about negotiation describes two main negotiation strategies, namely integrative 
(creating) strategy, and distributive (claiming) strategy (Brett & Thompson, 2016; Beersma & De 
Dreu, 2002; Barry & Friedman, 1998). The first strategy is based on sharing information, and 
creating a win-win situation with high joint outcomes, whereas the latter is more competitive 
striving for one’s own highest outcome. Wilson and Thompson (2014) describe that all 
negotiations are mixed-motive situations. So is not all black and white. In a mixed-motive 
situation individuals are not motivated to act fully competitive nor fully cooperative. Instead they 
have a cooperative motivation to reach an agreement, but also a selfish motivation to reach the 
best possible outcome for oneself.   
This research aims on finding answer to interesting questions as ‘What is the influence of 
power in a negotiation setting?’ and ‘Who will expand the pie in a negotiation, the powerful or 
the powerless?’ 
The influence of power in negotiations 
Power seems to have different definitions in psychology studies. In this study we 
maintain the following definition: “Power is the ability to influence behavior or outcomes of 
others” ( Magee, Galinsky & Greunfeld, 2007; Galinsky, Gruenfeld & Magee, 2003; Georgesen 
& Harris, 2006; Van Knippenberg, Van Knippenberg & Wilke, 2001). For the most of us, the 
goal of negotiation is gaining as much as possible for oneself. It is assumed that, when power 
difference come into play, the powerful will try to collect as much as possible and force the 
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powerless towards compliance. Research on power in negotiation settings however display 
contradictive outcomes. Power is mostly addressed as a negative component in psychology. 
Research shows that power leads to disinhibition of social norms (Galinsky et al., 2003), a 
devaluation towards the other party (Georgesen & Harris, 2006) and even in expressing some 
forms of aggressive behavior (Fast & Chen, 2009). Luckily, there are also some positive 
influence of power in negotiations. Powerful people within a negotiation often start taking action 
(Galinsky et al., 2003) and strive for a fair distribution of resources (Van Dijk & Vermunt, 
2000). So it seems that the influence of power on negotiations is not that bad after all.  
Interestingly Van Dijk and Vermunt (2000) compared different levels of power using the 
outcomes of ‘the dictator game’ and ‘the ultimatum game’.  In the ultimatum game the allocator  
(powerful) has some resources that (s)he can divide with the recipient (powerless) in any given 
way. The recipient can either accept or reject the offer. However in the dictator game the 
allocator has total power over the outcome. (S)he can divide the resources any way (s)he wants 
and the recipient has to except the offer, so is this game the recipient is totally powerless. In their 
findings Van Dijk and Vermunt (2000) suggest that the difference of power within the allocator 
evokes a strategic motivation in the ultimatum game, but evokes a concern for fairness in the 
dictator game as the results showed that participants (allocators) made higher offers towards the 
recipient in the dictator game compared to the offers in the ultimatum game. 
  So for example, a boss and a subordinate have to negotiate about different issues 
concerning a new sandwich bar. Some issues will have a compatible interest but others will have 
a integrative or distributive component. Although they have to run the sandwich bar together, 
during the negotiation the boss has total power, as (s)he is the one making the final call. Will the 
boss in this example act from a social perspective and give in to the subordinate in some 
(distributive) issues, or will (s)he handles in a pure selfish way and holds on to his/hers own best 
outcome? 
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The influence of social motives and cognitive biases in negotiations 
 Negotiations are influenced by social motives (De Dreu, Weingart & Kwon, 2000). 
Social motives are divided in either pro-social (cooperative) or pro-self (competitive). Pro-social 
behavior often leads to more integrative negotiation strategies (win-win), whereas pro-self 
behavior mostly leads to distributive negotiation strategies (win-lose) (De Dreu et al., 2000). 
These behavioral differences can be explained by the dual concern theory. This theory predicts 
that pro-social oriented people often use more integrative negotiation strategies, because they are 
not only concerned about their own outcomes, but also about the outcomes of the other party. 
Pro-self oriented people rely on distributive strategies in order to gain as much as possible for 
themselves (De Dreu et al., 2000; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986).   
 Negotiators seem to have a set cognitive biases unique for negotiation settings (Brett & 
Thompson, 2016; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Thompson and Hastie (1990) were the first who 
measured ‘the fixed pie perception’ within negotiators. The fixed pie perception can be described 
as: ”the faulty belief that the counterpart’s priorities and interests are completely and directly 
opposed to one’s own, when in fact this is not necessarily true”  (Brett & Thompson, 2016). 
Other cognitive biases described to be unique in negotiations are mostly extensions of the fixed 
pie perception like the incompatibility bias, a faulty belief that the counterpart has opposing 
interests, when in fact, they are in complete agreement (Brett & Thompson, 2016). Research 
showed that 40% of all negotiators fail to realize that their interests can be fully compatible with 
the counterpart (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). 
 Retrieving the example of a boss and the subordinate negotiating some issues involving a 
new sandwich bar, would the boss fall for the cognitive biases thinking the subordinate interests 
are opposing and will (s)he act pro-social or pro-self during the negotiation? We propose that the 
boss merely concerns about his own best outcomes, therefore we state that Hypotheses 1 is: High 
power people will have higher personal gains compared to low power people. 
 
“I’ve got the Power! So why should I expand the pie?!” 
5 
 
Expending the pie and logrolling 
 Considering the fixed pie perception as mentioned above, where negotiators use a 
distributive negotiation strategy thinking the counterpart interests are opposite of their own. In 
order to create an integrative strategy Fisher, Ury and Patton (1991) introduced the term: 
expanding the pie. By adding issues into the negotiation one or both parties can gain more, due 
to making the negotiation more integrative. These issues are valued differently by both parties 
where often one party loses or gains a little, but the other party gains a lot on a particular issue. 
Therefore both individual as joint outcomes reach higher goals when ‘expanding the pie’ is 
applied into a negotiation. In order to create the best outcome for all, people have to think 
creatively and explore all combinations of given alternatives before reaching an agreement 
(Fisher, Ury & Patton, 1991). 
 Another term used in modern negotiation settings is ‘logrolling’. Logrolling is the act of 
trading across issues in a negotiation. Logrolling requires that a negotiator knows his or her own 
priorities, but also the priorities of the other side. If one side values something more than the 
other, they should be given it in exchange for reciprocity on issues that are a higher priority to 
their opponent (Moran & Ritov, 2002). 
 Try to implement these terms into the previous example, would the boss (powerful) add 
more issues to the negotiation even for a small gain or loss, and would (s)he consider logrolling? 
Creating a new paradigm 
 Most mixed-motives negotiation games involving power dispersion have a fixed amount 
of issues that need to settle agreement. Therefore it is hard to enlarge the pie if new issues cannot 
be assigned to the payoff schedule. Trying to bring new insight on using ‘expanding the pie’ in 
negotiations, we therefore created a new paradigm: “ the mandatory-optional issue paradigm”. 
Almost all studies concerning mixed-motives negotiation games use a fixed set of issues on a 
payoff schedule that participants, depending on the research, can either reject or agree on. 
However, we think that it is better to use optional issues, so that the concept of expanding the pie 
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can be introduced in a mixed-motive negotiation game. We came up with a new negotiation 
exercise involving five mandatory issues and three optional issues given one participant full 
power by being the boss. In this light we are curious if participants will use the optional issues 
and expand the pie, or rather stick to the mandatory issues. Because the boss can decide which 
issues will be discussed, we propose that the boss will initiate to discuss the optional issues, 
either the optional issues will be discussed, but only if the boss benefits, therefore we state that 
Hypotheses 2 is: High power people will negotiate over optional issues, but only if it can result 
in personal gain, compared to when it can result in personal losses. 
  
  
Method 
Participants and Design 
 A total of 314 participants were recruited for this study, and formed 157 dyads. The 
sample consisted 132 males and 182 females. The age ranged from 18 to 72, with a mean of 
27.54 (SD = 11.13). Participants were recruited outside the lab in public places, like bars, 
libraries, sport clubs, dining halls etc. Most participants were recruited in the Netherlands, but 
this study was also conducted in Germany and Spain. Therefore the instruction forms were 
translated in English, Dutch and Spanish. 61,2% of the dyads received the instructions in Dutch, 
35% in English and 3,8% in Spanish. We tried to avoid dyads whom were involved in a romantic 
relationship, trying to control for natural power asymmetry in a relation. The experiment lasted 
between 15 and 30 minutes and the participants were assigned to one of the four experimental 
conditions, 2 (Gain: boss gains vs. boss loses) x 2 (role in the negotiation: boss vs. subordinate) 
design. The first two factors were manipulated between dyads, and the second two factors were 
manipulated within dyads. . As to not confound the experimental manipulation with potential 
differences in gender constellations, another study was aimed to have all four gender 
constellations (i.e., male-male, powerful male with powerless female, powerful female with 
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powerless male, female-female) in comparable numbers in each experimental condition. 53 
dyads were composed of two females, 30 dyads of two men and 74 dyads were mixed. Of these 
74 mixes dyads, 34 dyads consisted of the female in the role of boss and 40 dyads consisted of 
the male in the roll of boss. Participants could choice between a reward of € 2,=, a hot or cold 
beverage or a package of stroopwafels, as an incentive for participating.   
Procedure and Negotiation Task 
 The experiment was conducted at the same spot where the participants were recruited. 
After reading the informed consent, participants were asked to sign if they understood and 
agreed. Then participants received a one page instruction form (negotiation procedure and rules 
of the negotiation game, Appendix 1). Participants had to imagine to run a sandwich bar 
together. One was assigned to be the boss (powerful) and the other to be the subordinate 
(powerless). Dyads had to negotiate over five mandatory issues and could negotiate over another 
three optional issues. The goal of the negotiation task was to earn as much points as possible for 
oneself. Participants received  a payoff schedule where five mandatory and the three optional 
issues were presented and the distribution of points was sighted with three or four possible 
agreement outcomes (Appendices 4,5,6 and 7). The five mandatory issues ( see Table 1) 
contained one compatible issue (duration of work shifts), two distributive issues (division of tips 
and cleaning schedule) and two integrative issues (sandwiches and day closed). The optional 
issues were ingredients, stroopwafels and fresh juice (see Table 2). Depending on the 
experimental condition (boss gains vs. boss loses) each of the optional issues provided a small 
loss for the one party, but a much bigger gain for the other party. The instruction form stated 
clearly if the participants could not reach an agreement on one of the five mandatory issues, the 
boss (powerful) could decide the agreement unilaterally. After reading the instruction form and 
payoff schedule for a few minutes, participants were asked to answer four questions on a pre-
negotiation task questionnaire (Appendix 2) in order to check if the participants understood the 
payoff schedule and the manipulation (powerful vs. powerless). They also received a form to fill 
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out their agreement outcomes and the points they collected (Appendix 3). Participants were 
given 20 minutes for conducting the negotiation task. After the negotiation task and filling in 
their agreements and total score, participants received a post-negotiation questionnaire (i.e., 
negotiation behavior, perceptions of atmosphere and manipulation check questions, Appendix 8) 
with a 46 item on a 7-point Likert scale. At the end participants were thanked for their 
participation, handed a debriefing and were giving their chosen reward.  
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Table 1 
Overview of the points distribution for the mandatory issues for the boss and the subordinate. 
Issue Agreeable solutions Points given 
  Subordinate Boss 
Work shifts: 6 hours 0 -1 
 8 hours +1 +1 
 9.5 hours -1 0 
Day closed: Saturday +2 0 
 Sunday 0 +4 
 Monday +1 +2 
Division of tips: Share tips with all 0 +4 
 Share 75% +1 +3 
 Share 50% +2 +2 
 Share 25% +3 +1 
 Keep all for oneself +4 0 
Sandwiches: Only Vegetarian +4 0 
 Vegetarian and fish +2 +1 
 Vegetarian, fish and meat 0 +2 
Cleaning schedule: Hire somebody +4 0 
 Cleaning after night shift 0 +4 
 Cleaning before day shift +1 +1 
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Table 2 
Overview of points distribution of the optional issues both gaining and losing conditions. 
Issue Agreement Boss 
gains 
Boss  
losses 
Subordinate 
gains 
Subordinate 
losses 
Ingredients:  No agreement 0 0 0 0 
 Option A +2 -1 +2 -1 
 Option B +4 -2 +4 -2 
Stroopwafels: No agreement 0 0 0 0 
 Option A +2 -1 +2 -1 
 Option B +4 -2 +4 -2 
Fresh Juice: No agreement 0 0 0 0 
 Option A +2 -1 +2 -1 
 Option B +4 -2 +4 -2 
 
Independent Variables  
 Manipulation of power. The instruction form participants received before starting the 
negotiation clearly stated “if you cannot agree on a solution for a problem, then you, the boss, 
have to decide which solution to choice” (see Appendix 1). Also the experimenter additional 
mentioned the power manipulation towards the participants, telling that they have to reach an 
agreement on the five mandatory issues within the given time and if they could not reach an 
agreement the boss (powerful) unilaterally decided the agreement. 
 Manipulation of benefit in optional issues. Two conditions were created in order to 
manipulate benefit in the optional issues, “boss benefits points” vs. “subordinate benefits 
points”. In the boss benefits points condition, the boss (powerful) could either gain a small 
amount of points, a big amount of points or decide to select the third option: “no solution on this 
issue”. In this condition the subordinate (powerless) could lose a small amount of points, a 
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bigger amount of point or also decide not to reach an agreement on this issue. In the subordinate 
benefits points condition the payoff schedules were reversed for the boss and the subordinate. 
Measures 
 Individual outcome. By adding up the points earned on reaching an agreement on the 
five mandatory issues and the three optional issues the individual outcomes of each participant 
was measured. The lowest score achieved for the powerful was -2 and the highest score 27 (M = 
10.68, SD = 5.52). The lowest score achieved for the powerless was -7 and the highest possible 
score 25 (M = 6.79, SD = 5.19). 
 Individual outcome of mandatory issues. By adding up the points participants achieved 
on the five mandatory issue results were calculated. For the powerful the lowest achievement 
was 3 and the highest was 15 points (M = 9.29, SD = 2.75). For the powerless the lowest result 
was -1 and the highest was 13 points (M = 5.92, SD = 2.67). 
 Individual outcome of optional issues. Individual outcomes of optional issues was 
calculated by adding up the points participants achieved on the three optional issues. The lowest 
amount of points -6 and the highest amount of points 12 was equal for both conditions (one 
could lose or gain equal amount of point depending on the condition gain vs. loses). This resulted 
for the powerful (M = 1.38, SD = 4.47) and the powerless (M = 0.87, SD = 4.24). 
 Number of optional issues added. By summing up the number of optional issues added 
to the negotiation agreement the results were calculated. 19% of all dyads did not integrate any 
of the optional issues (i.e., option no agreement), 27,4% of all dyads added one issue in the 
agreement, 26,8% added two issues to the agreement and the latter 26,8% added all three issues. 
 Wanting to add optional issues. In order to get insight in the desire of participants of 
adding the optional issues, we used three items in the post-negotiation questionnaire, for example 
“I wanted to select a solution for the problem Stroopwafels”. The question was the same for the 
other two optional issues. The answers for these three questions was highly reliable, for the 
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powerful, α = .82, for the powerless, α = .86. Therefore we constructed the scale want to add 
optional issues (Mpowerless = 12.6, SD = 5.70; Mpowerful = 12.1, SD = 5.71). 
Manipulation check perceived power asymmetry. To measure whether the participants 
did experience the difference in power between the boss and the subordinate, we added three 
questions to the post-negotiation questionnaire scaled on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all; 7 
= very much). Statements were presented and the participants could indicate to what extent they 
agreed: “I could basically decide whatever I wanted”, “During the negotiation, I had a powerful 
position”, “During the negotiation, I was dependent on the other player in order to reach a deal” 
(recoded). The first two questions showed an questionable internal consistency for the powerless, 
α = .65 and for the powerful, α = .67. The third question was not a strong indicator for power. 
Based on these outcomes we computed a new variable perceived power (Mpowerless = 6.63, SD = 
2.65; Mpowerful = 9.41, SD = 3.05). 
   Negotiation atmosphere. Two questions in the post-negotiation questionnaire were 
designed to measure how participants experienced the atmosphere during the negotiation task. 
The answers showed a good internal consistency for the powerful, α = .80, and for the powerless, 
α = .89. Thus we created the scale negotiation atmosphere (Mpowerful = 11.16, SD = 2.41; 
Mpowerless = 10.71, SD = 2.75).  
 Turnover and break off intensions. Participants were asked three items in the post-
negotiation questionnaire if they really had the intension to work at this sandwich bar (e.g. “If I 
actually worked in the bar, I would consider quitting the job after this negotiation”). The data 
showed a questionable internal consistency between the items for the powerful α = .55, as well 
for the powerless α = .65. therefore we redesigned the variable turnover and break off intensions 
(Mpowerful = 10.28, SD = 3.61; Mpowerless = 11.93, SD = 4.05).  
Concern for others. To get a better insight of the social aspect during negotiations we 
added four questions to the post-negotiation questionnaire regarding concern for others (e.g. “In 
the negotiation, I found it very important to take the others interest in account”).  Only the last 
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three items showed a questionable internal consistency regarding concern for others (αpowerful = 
.72; αpowerless = .69). We still created the variable concern for others (Mpowerful = 13.89, SD = 3.85; 
Mpowerless = 13.53, SD = 3.72). 
 Conflict handling. We used a the minimalistic version of the Dutch test of Conflict 
handling (De Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer & Nauta, 2001) getting an impression how 
participants handled conflicts during the negotiation task. Therefore we added four items to the 
post-negotiation questionnaire regarding problem solving (e.g. “I adapted to the other’s party 
goals and interests”). The data resulted in a questionable internal consistency (αpowerful = .71; 
αpowerless = .66). Although the internal consistency was not high, we created the scale problem 
solving behavior (Mpowerful = 18.02, SD = 4.13; Mpowerless = 19.3, SD = 3.64). To measure how 
participants were forcing their own preferences, three questions were used from the Dutch test of 
Handling (De Dreu et al., 2001). The questions were assigned as good internal consistency for 
both parties (αpowerful = .85; αpowerless = .86). We created the variable forcing (Mpowerful = 14.76, SD 
= 4.23; Mpowerless = 14.66, SD = 4.01).  
 
Results 
Manipulation check for power dispersion 
 In the pre-negotiation questionnaire we added one manipulation check question: “Who is 
the most powerful in your team?”. Participants in the powerful condition identified themselves 
92,4% as being the powerful, whereas the subordinate identified the boss 89,8% as the powerful. 
These findings indicated that our power dispersion manipulation was successful before starting 
the negotiation. 
 A second manipulation check was formed in the post-negotiation questionnaire. We 
performed a repeated measures (ANOVA) on the new variables perceived power. The boss felt 
significantly more powerful (M = 4.37, SD = 1.08) then the subordinate (M = 3.79, SD = .86), F 
(1, 146) = 20.72, p < .001.  
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Effects of power on individual outcomes 
 In order to check if power dispersion has an effect on individual outcomes (Hypothesis 
1), we compared the individual total outcomes of the boss (M = 10.63, SD = 5.51) with the 
individual outcomes of the subordinate (M = 6.82, SD = 5.20). A repeated measures (ANOVA) 
showed that the high power person (the boss) significantly has higher personal outcomes 
compared to the low power person (the subordinate), F(1, 155) = 20.69, p < .001. This effect was 
also found comparing the outcomes of the mandatory issues. The boss scored significantly more 
points (M = 9.28, SD = 2.75) compared to the subordinate (M = 5.92, SD = 2.68), F(1, 155) = 
63.12, p < .001. However, power did not seem to had an effect on the scores of the optional 
issues. Therefore power has an effect on the outcomes of negotiations, but only for mandatory 
issues to discuss.   
Effects of benefit on expanding the pie 
 To test whether or not the boss would initiate the optional issues only when (s)he benefits 
(Hypothesis 2), we conducted a repeated measures (ANOVA), showed that when people could 
benefit from the optional issues they significantly scored more points compared to the situation 
they could not benefit from the optional issues, F(1, 154) = 2.98, p < .001. The influence of 
power dispersion did not seem to have an effect (see table 3). Therefore we conclude that people 
are willing to negotiate over optional issues, but only if they benefit, regardless whether or not 
they are in a powerful or powerless situation. 
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Table 3 
Overview of means and standard deviations of the optional issues comparing with the factor of 
benefit.  
 Benefits Mean SD 
Optional subordinate Boss -2.49 1.81 
 Subordinate 4.02 3.34 
Optional boss Boss 4.98 3.62 
 subordinate -2.01 1.67 
 
 
Discussion 
 The aim of this study was to investigate the influence of power in negotiations and if 
people in a powerful situation would discuss optional issues even if they had to sacrifice points. 
Studies on the influence of asymmetric power in a dyad negotiation setting show contradictive 
outcomes. On one hand asymmetric power within a negotiation setting leads to better deals (Van 
Dijk & Vermunt, 2000), whereas other studies claim that asymmetric power leads to worse 
outcomes for all parties (Greer & Van Kleef, 2010) due to disinhibition of social norms 
(Galinsky et al., 2003) and devaluation towards the other party (Georgesen & Harris, 2006). It 
was predicted that power asymmetry would result into a selfish powerful person, only 
concerning about their own outcome. By adding issues into a negotiation people could strive for 
better individual and joint outcomes (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991). Because powerful people in a 
negotiation react in a more competitive manner (Chen & Welland, 2002), we predicted that 
powerful people only use optional issues if they benefit. To investigate this, a face to face, role 
playing negotiation study was conducted in the field. Using participants from the general 
population with no romantic relation in a dyad setting.  
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The advantage of power  
 The pre- and post-negotiation checks both showed a successful power manipulation. 
Participants where fully aware whom was the powerful or the powerless person during the 
negotiation game. As predicted the powerful person reacted competitive concerning about high 
personal outcomes, in line with the study by Chen and Welland (2002). However, it is partly 
contradictive to the results of the study of Van Dijk and Vermunt (2000). Although this research 
did not compare different levels of power, it could be said that the powerful person would be 
more pro-social. In our research the boss could act like a dictator, because it was told that in the 
end (s)he decided the outcome of the issues (both mandatory and optional). Therefore a more 
pro-social approach of the powerful person would be possible. The most likely explanation is 
that people in a powerful position act in a pro-self (competitive) way, and therefore use 
integrative negotiation strategies, instead of being more pro-social (cooperative) and strive a 
win-win situation (De Dreu et al., 2000). Luckily while exploring the data it is not all black and 
white. Only 5,7% of the powerful persons collected there maximum amount of points (15) in the 
mandatory issues. More than half of the powerful participants (56,4%) did not received more 
than 9 points. So there seems to be some kind of pro-social behavior. The explanation could be 
found in mixed-motive situations (Wilson & Thompson, 2014). As they described that people, 
regardless asymmetric power, have a cooperative motivation to reach an agreement, but also a 
selfish motivation to reach the best possible outcome for themselves.  
Adding optional issues to the negotiation 
 While analyzing the data we found a significant indicator that people are willing to add 
optional issues into the negotiation game (expanding the pie), but only if they could benefit. The 
power manipulation did not seem to had any effect in this situation. The prediction that the 
powerful person would only use the optional issues if they could benefit is therefore partly true.  
People in general seem to have a inhibited reaction when they a faced with a negative outcome. 
A possible explanation for this behavior is “loss aversion”. Loss aversion is the tendency of 
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people to avoid losses to acquiring equivalent gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). In our study 
participants also tried to avoid losses in the optional issues, not considering possible gains 
renegotiating the mandatory issues. A more specific anomaly probably could be addressed to the 
behavior of our participants namely, “Myopic loss aversion”. This type of loss aversion shows 
that people are more preoccupied with present negative outcomes then possible greater gains in 
the future, and therefore only think in short-terms (Haigh & List, 2005). Participants in our study 
showed the same reaction. Instead of giving in a little on the optional issues, and gaining more in 
the mandatory issues, they only tried to avoid losing points when discussing the optional issues. 
Another explanation could be that people are not aware of logrolling (Moran & Ritov, 2002). 
The basic principle of logrolling is chairing information, in order to get better individual and 
joint outcome. The participants in our study mostly withhold the information of how many points 
they could earn on the issue discussed. Only being preoccupied by gaining as much as possible 
points for themselves, and avoiding losing points, they could not see the overall picture of 
gaining not only maximum individual points, but also striving for a higher joint outcome.   
Strengths, limitations and suggestions for future research 
 A lot of research studying dyad negotiations are in a laboratory stetting, using (mostly 
psychology) students whom collect some kind of study points or another payment contributing 
their study. In other words they are not in for the negotiation, but purely for their graduation. In 
the current study we collected the data in face to face interactions between people randomly on 
the street. These were people from the general population, where we tried to combine unknown  
people to each other avoiding power hierarchy within a relationship.  By introducing this 
research as a field experiment we wanted to create a more natural environment, like most dyad 
negotiations often are. Therefore the data of this research increases experimental realism and 
strengths the external validity of the results.  
 However a field experiment comes with a price. Collecting data from the general 
population is not as easy as it sounds. Using bars, sports clubs and dining halls as negotiation 
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stetting ensures distraction of attention. Especially trying to combine people who are never 
introduced to each other in the past. Before starting the negotiation game, participants were far 
more busy introducing themselves instead of reading and listing to the instructions. Being less 
prepared and annoyed giving their spare time to this experiment, some participants agreed as fast 
as possible in order to go back to what they were doing. The data was collected in the winter 
months. This narrowed the public places where we could collect participants.  
 Follow up studies should use this knowledge and try to avoid the mistakes mentioned 
above. We still argue it is better to use participants without any relationship, but it may be wise 
to include a short introduction round. Furthermore it could be helpful to create a separate space 
to conduct the negotiation, instead of using the same area where other people (friends, family, 
etc.) are in the surrounding.  
 Although we tried to make a biased free negotiation game, after collecting the data we 
came to the conclusion that we did not succeed properly. One of the hiatus was the way of 
reward structure that we used. People were told to collect as much points as possible for 
themselves, which gave them only intrinsic motivation. However the points were meaningless, as 
all participants gain the same reward for participating in this research. People were only trying to 
get a better result of points then the other party, instead of trying to collect as much points as 
possible.   
 In order to avoid this problem future studies should not only notice the individual 
outcome, but also the joint outcome and a monetary reward system for those collecting the most 
points after the whole study is finished.    
 The second hiatus in this study was entered in the post-negotiation questionnaire. One of 
the questions about power probably was not as clear as we thought. Therefore the reliability of 
the power manipulation was less combining these three “power manipulation” questions into a 
new variable.  
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 Exploring the data we wanted to analyze the joint outcomes and comparing them with 
benefit as a factor. While exploring we came to the conclusion that participants were not able to 
collect the same amount of points. Another hiatus was detected. Creating a whole new 
negotiation game, we were more bothered about the questions and answers then the reward 
system. Dyads were not able to collect the same amount of points in the different settings. 
Therefore it was not possible and useful to explore the joint outcomes in the dataset.  
 Especially a research on expanding the pie must have a focus on higher joint outcomes. 
To really make sure that participants are not only interested in individual outcome, but trying to 
reach the best possible outcome, the distribution of points on the different issues should equal at 
the end of the negotiation. Maximum joint outcomes should be equal in future research in all 
different settings.      
 Creating a new negotiation game, we simply added the optional issues below the 
mandatory. While collecting the data we were faced with participants starting the negotiation 
with the mandatory issues standing above on the point schedule, and after discussing the 
mandatory issues try to discuss the optional issues (expanding the pie). New research on this 
topic should consider bounding the mandatory and optional issues. We failed combining the 
issues. Participants were eager to reach an agreement on the mandatory issues, and afterwards 
they could negotiate about the optional issues. After our research we are convinced that future 
research  should mix the mandatory and optional issues. Furthermore explaining more the benefit 
of charging information to come to a better joint outcome. 
Theoretical Implications   
 This study contributes to the great pool of research in negotiations. There is still a 
contradiction within research outcomes involving asymmetric power. Results of this study add to 
the believe that people in a powerful position mostly strive for high individual outcomes, and the 
powerless give in quit easily. In line with the research of Chen and Welland (2002) participants 
in het powerful position acted in a competitive manner. Even if the asymmetric power gives the 
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powerful person a dictator role, participants where only concerned about their own outcome, so it 
partly contradicts the outcome of the study by Van Dijk and Vermunt (2000), who suggested that 
participants in a dictator role evokes a more concern of fairness (more cooperative) distributing 
the points. Knowing it is not fair comparing our research with that of Van Dijk and Vermunt 
(2000), baseline is: Powerful people in a negotiation setting act purely competitive, even when 
they have total power deciding the outcome of an issue. 
 The mandatory-optional issue paradigm used in this study, did not solve the fixed pie 
perception. Expecting expanding the pie using logrolling was hold off. Introducing optional 
issues to the negotiation game is probably not enough to engage people in overseeing the whole 
picture, use creative thinking and strive for better mutual outcomes. Power asymmetry did not 
seem to influence bringing the optional issues to the table. Only benefit seemed to make the 
difference. Therefore we suggest future research to advice people sharing information 
(logrolling) over the issues discussed, and moreover try to let participants understand the benefit 
of discussing the optional options. This study showed that participants prefer a gain, but are not 
willing to make a little sacrifice in order to get a better deal.  
Practical implication 
 Reserved vision is required deriving practical advice from a single experiment. However 
the current study showed that asymmetric power still leads to a significant better individual 
outcome of the powerful. Powerful people react more competitive in negotiations (Chen & 
Welland, 2000), and therefore receive worst joint outcomes (Greer & Van Kleef, 2010). Most 
people still think that a negotiation only contains distributive issues, instead of realizing most 
negotiations are more of a integrative nature (Brett & Thompson, 2016; Beersma & Van Dreu, 
2002; Barry & Friedman, 1998). Communicating the advantage of logrolling and expanding the 
pie would create a better joint outcome and a clearly win-win situation. It is hard to change the 
mindset of people still holding on to a distributive strategy. But we strongly believe that a clear 
and proper educational expression, should lead to better negotiation outcomes and a more win-
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win situation. Not only for business people facing negotiations on an everyday base, but also for 
the general population. If we could convince people chairing information during a negotiation, 
and trying to oppose optional issues into a bargaining, joint outcomes would improve. 
Conclusion 
 The main question of this research was, if asymmetry of power would have a significant 
effect on expanding the pie in a negotiation setting. We suggested that powerful people would 
act selfish gaining only points for a better personal outcome, and use the optional issues if they 
benefit. It seems that it does not make a difference in power perception adding the optional 
issues (expanding the pie). The only concern is gaining. People do not oversee the total picture 
and are willing to take a little sacrifice in order to get a better gain. Even introduced to the 
mandatory-optional issues paradigm, facilitating value creation, did not create overall and 
creative thinking, but simply was used if people were in a benefit position. Asymmetric power 
does not seem to have any effect on this outcome. 
 This research thus suggest that people still act with a distributive strategy in a 
negotiation, where the powerful person acts competitive and strives for the highest possible 
individual outcome. Asymmetric power does not seem to have any effect on introducing the 
optional issues (expanding the pie). Loss aversion seems to come in place. Even a little sacrifice 
bothers people more, than trying to see the big picture. Thus, is does not matter if you got the 
power, as long as you do not chair information, only think in a distributive strategy, an win-win 
situation never will arise.    
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Appendix 
 
  
Appendix 1. Example of the instructions for Mark/Mary, the boss. 
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Appendix 2. Pre-negotiation questionnaire.  
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Appendix 3. Form to fill in the agreements on the issues negotiated.  
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Appendix 4. Example of the payoff schedule; powerless in leader gains condition. 
 
Appendix 5. Example of the payoff schedule; powerful in leader gains condition. 
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Appendix 6. Example of the payoff schedule; powerless in leader losses condition. 
 
 
Appendix 7. Example of the payoff schedule; powerful in leader losses condition. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
